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Each year the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review publishes a 
special edition in which five competitively selected students write 
articles on individual topics within a larger area of law that is 
undergoing significant contemporary evolution. This issue continues 
that tradition, focusing on emerging developments in the law 
governing armed conflict, traditionally known as “the law of war,” or 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as it is now increasingly 
being called. 
The cliché that “9/11 changed everything” rings particularly true 
with respect to public discussion of this subject. Prior to 
September 11, 2001, interest in the law of war was largely confined 
to military officials and scholars; a handful of civilian organizations, 
such as human rights groups and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC); and those directly involved with the practice of 
international criminal law. Only a few U.S. law schools offered 
courses addressing the subject, and the term “war” was seemingly 
applied to metaphorical battles against problems like cancer, crime, 
drugs, and poverty more often than to actual armed conflict. While 
many remember President George W. Bush reading Florida 
schoolchildren a book about goats during the World Trade Center 
attacks, few now recall he was doing so as part of the “War on 
Illiteracy” he had declared just the previous day.1 
∗ Professor of Law and Lloyd Tevis Fellow, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
1. See, e.g., Stephen Hegarty, Bush Calls for War on Illiteracy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/091101/Worldandnation/Bush_calls
_for_war_on.shtml. 
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When Bush first spoke about a “war” against terrorists the day 
after 9/11,2 it was thus unclear whether he meant this was to be 
another figurative fight or an actual armed conflict. Until that time 
terrorism had been treated almost exclusively as a criminal matter,3 
and the president himself had spoken about the need “to find those 
responsible and to bring them to justice” in his public address the 
previous evening.4 But over the next few weeks it became clear that 
this was meant to be an actual “war.” Congress quickly enacted an 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) permitting the 
president to conduct hostilities against both those responsible for the 
attacks and those that had aided or sheltered them.5 Two United 
Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions referenced the United 
States’ right of self-defense,6 while the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) recognized 9/11 as the only armed attack on a 
member state justifying collective military measures in the alliance’s 
half-century of existence.7 Any residual doubts about the actuality of 
this conflict were dispelled by the October 7, 2001, launch of 
offensive combat operations against targets in Afghanistan under the 
moniker “Operation Enduring Freedom,” beginning what has 
become the longest war in U.S. history. 
Despite specific past tense language in AUMF authorizing 
hostilities only against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks (al 
Qaeda) and any entity that had aided or sheltered them (the Afghan 
Taliban), however, President Bush soon began referring to a “global 
war on terror” and eventually broadened the scope of hostilities to 
include groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban) 
2. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National
Security Team, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 12, 2001, 10:53 AM EDT), http://georgewbush 
-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html.
3. See, e.g., David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of
War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 966–69 (2009). 
4. George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE (Sept. 11, 2001, 8:30 PM EDT), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/71940.htm. 
5. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)). 
6. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (both referencing the inherent right of self-defense in their 
preambles). 
7. See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., Countering Terrorism, http://www
.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm? (last updated Apr. 8, 2015 4:57 PM). 
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which did not even exist in 2001.8 And although the Obama 
administration publicly backed away from the controversial “global 
war” terminology, it nevertheless continued the expansion of U.S. 
military operations to target additional organizations such as Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Somalian Al Shabaab group, 
both of which were also founded well after 9/11.9 
Collectively, these events have had the practical consequence of 
transforming the law of war from a comparatively obscure discipline 
into a matter of common concern for anyone endeavoring to 
participate in informed public discourse about post-9/11 U.S. 
national security policies. Treating terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban—a group asserting to be the legitimate government of 
Afghanistan yet recognized as such by only three other Islamic 
nations—as adversaries in an armed conflict gives rise to a number 
of challenging legal questions. International legal rules governing 
armed conflicts between actual states are well developed. But the 
Bush administration quickly concluded that the best-known law of 
war provisions—those found in the four Geneva Conventions of 
194910—were inapplicable to al Qaeda, which was not a state, and 
that Taliban fighters failed to qualify for Convention protections due 
to their failure to wear uniforms or follow the law of war.11 The 
unique attributes of this conflict have resulted in continuing 
uncertainty about which existing legal provisions should apply, 
complicating the assessment of decisions to rely upon law of war 
authority to for such matters as targeting (including the subsequent 
use of armed drones), indefinite detention, and military trials of 
8. See, e.g., David Glazier, The Drone—It’s in the Way That You Use It, in PREVENTATIVE 
FORCE: TARGETED KILLING AND TECHNOLOGY (Kirsten Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos ed.) 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2563657. 
9. Id. at 4–5.
10. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. 
11. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Vice
President et al., Humane Treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available 
at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. 
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suspected terrorists. The importance of these questions has led to 
burgeoning scholarly interest in this field. By 2007, 96 out of 101 
U.S. academics responding to a joint American University-ICRC 
survey reported that IHL was now being taught at their institutions, 
either as a stand-alone course or at least covered topically within 
another course,12 while a 2015 Westlaw search found that a 
remarkable 6,200 law review articles published since 9/11 include 
the term “law of war” in their text.13 
This new enthusiasm for law of war issues extends beyond the 
overall conduct of the so-called “war on terror.” The increasingly 
frequent use of the internet as a means to disrupt economic or 
governmental functions across borders, or even across the globe, has 
led to extensive discourse and theorizing about “cyber warfare,” for 
example. And today’s remote controlled drones have stimulated 
prognostication and debate about a future expected to prominently 
feature “autonomous weapons” that will make independent decisions 
to kill without human intervention. 
Given these developments, it is not surprising that most law 
students now express some interest in law of war issues.14 But I was 
still a bit apprehensive when approached by this law review’s Chief 
Developments Editor and asked to serve as the faculty advisor for 
this issue, which would feature student-written articles on topics they 
would select from the broad scope of this overall body of law. I knew 
that the review’s highly competitive Developments selection process 
would yield very bright, and highly motivated, students who were 
capable researchers and writers. But as a dedicated law of war 
scholar, I have all too often been disappointed by the efforts of 
12. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS & WASH. COLL. OF LAW, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AT U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 7, available at https://www.wcl.american.edu/ 
humright/center/documents/IHLSurveyReport.pdf. 
13. The author searched WestlawNext selecting just the “Law Reviews & Journals”
checkbox under “Secondary Sources” for exact phrase “law of war” and date after 09-11-2001 on 
March 29, 2015, returning exactly 6,200 results. An entry-by-entry review of the first one 
hundred returns found that twelve had appeared in military journals; the remaining eighty-eight 
included a broad range of articles published in general and specialty journals. A review of the first 
one hundred entries from a similar search of work before 9/11 found that fully 40 percent of the 
works incorporating the phrase “law of war” were from military publications while many of the 
civilian publications were shorter notes, book reviews, and even a memorial notice. 
14. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS & WASH. COLL. OF LAW, supra note 12, at 8
(reporting 92 percent of students surveyed are “interested” or “very interested” in legal issues 
related to the “war on terror” with 96 percent reporting that level of interest in law governing 
“armed conflict”). 
Spring 2015] LAW OF WAR ISSUE INTRODUCTION 819 
otherwise impressive professional commentators who have been 
enticed to leap into the post-9/11 publication fray by the “sexiness” 
of these topics but lacked the requisite background knowledge to 
produce credible contributions to this field. I was thus a bit skeptical 
as to whether law students without any prior grounding in this 
complex subset of international law would be able to produce work 
that would meaningfully advance our understanding of the issues 
they addressed. In hindsight I need not have worried. I now have the 
significant honor to being able to state categorically that each of the 
pieces comprising this volume does, in fact, offer important original 
insights that would do a professional academic proud! 
II. CLASSIFYING THE CONFLICT WITH AL-QAEDA
The first article, written by Andrew Beshai,15 takes on the 
substantial challenge of locating the conflict against al-Qaeda within 
the two overall conflict classifications—international and 
non-international-recognized by the law of war. When this conflict 
began back in the fall of 2001, the answer seemed relatively 
straightforward. To get to Osama bin Laden and the core of his 
terrorist organization, the United States committed military forces to 
an intervention in Afghanistan, engaging in direct hostilities against 
both al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the latter the de facto governing force 
of that nation. Although President Bush concluded that the specific 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable to these 
groups, the government nevertheless considered this to be an 
international armed conflict,16 and felt entitled to draw authority 
from the applicable body of governing law for such collateral 
purposes as justifying the detention, and military trial, of opposing 
forces.17 
This straightforward understanding was called into question five 
years later, however, when the Supreme Court halted military 
commission proceedings against Osama bin Laden’s erstwhile driver 
and sometime bodyguard, Salim Hamdan. The Court found that the 
commission failed to measure up to either requirements of the 
15. Andrew Beshai, The Boundless War: Challenging the Notion of a Global Armed Conflict
Against Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 829 (2015). 
16. Bush, supra note 11.
17. See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 § 1(e) (2002) (calling for military 
detention and trial of members of al Qaeda). 
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Uniform Code of Military Justice or to fair trial standards found in 
Common Article 3 (CA3) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
single provision in those treaties applicable to non-international 
armed conflict.18 In reaching this result, the Court determined that it 
“need not decide” the merits of the harder question of whether the 
full texts of the 1949 Conventions, applicable only to international 
conflicts “between two or more of the High Contracting Parties” 
applied.19 Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court noted the 
government’s argument that al Qaeda, as a non-state group, could not 
qualify as a “High Contracting Party”20 before concluding that the 
conflict would then, by default, be “not of an international character” 
and CA3 would thus apply.21 (He then went on to demonstrate that 
the Guantánamo commissions as being conducted at that time failed 
to satisfy CA3’s requirement for trials by a “regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensible by civilized peoples.”)22 Stevens’ simplistic linguistic 
conclusion has subsequently been widely adopted without serious 
question, and the U.S. government now tends to treat its fight against 
al Qaeda and associated groups as a single non-international armed 
conflict spanning a number of diverse countries.23 
The problem with this approach is that it fails to comport with 
either the facial language of CA3 or the legal logic underlying 
international law’s bifurcation of conflict types. Read more fully, 
CA3 explicitly states that it applies to an “armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties.”24 The use of the word “one” in this context is 
not coincidental; it reflects the core reason why non-international 
conflicts have always been subject to less international regulation 
than their intra-state counterparts. Prior to the international 
recognition of human rights in the UN Charter, international law 
essentially only regulated states in their external dealings with one 
18. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
19. Id. at 629–30 (quoting Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 628–30.
22. Id. at 631–35 (quoting Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
23. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda, OPINIO JURIS
(May 6, 2011, 11:54 PM EDT), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/06/the-armed-conflict-with-al 
-qaeda/.
24. Geneva I; Geneva II; Geneva III; Geneva IV.
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another. It made sense for them to accept mutually binding, and 
advantageous, restrictions on their conduct of hostilities with one 
another, and a robust body of international conflict regulations has 
been developed over the last two centuries.25 But states were 
reluctant to accept any external regulation of their conduct when 
dealing with non-state adversaries (i.e., rebels) within their own 
territory. These situations involved conflict against individuals who 
were breaching a duty of loyalty to the state they were fighting; that 
is to say, they were committing treason. And because the conflict 
was taking place within the state’s own sovereign territory, it could 
bring the full scope of its domestic laws to bear, obviating the need 
for any international legal authority for such matters as detention or 
trial of opposing fighters. 
The recognition of international human rights after the Second 
World War meant that states logically accepted the intrusion of 
international law restrictions into their domestic conduct for the first 
time, and it thus made sense that the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
included the initial, albeit minor, restrictions on state conduct of 
non-international hostilities.26 But the application of these lesser 
restrictions—as compared to the robust regulation of international 
armed conflicts—was contingent upon the restricted geographic and 
political scope of the conflict. This was implicitly reconfirmed by the 
Additional Geneva Protocol II (APII) of 1977 that provided a modest 
expansion of the protections afforded by CA3. APII’s application 
was thus expressly limited to conflicts “which take place in the 
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups . . . .”27 
APII made another significant contribution to the definition of 
non-international armed conflicts, explicitly requiring the existence 
of a sufficient level of sustained violence for a situation to constitute 
qualifying hostilities. The second paragraph of APII’s Article 1 
declares that “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 
25. See, e.g., ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
1–10, 22–25 (3d ed. 2000). 
26. See id. at 24.
27. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II) art. 1, ¶ 1, 
June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. 
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similar nature” do not qualify as armed conflicts.28 This floor 
logically precludes application of law of war rules to many 
situations, requiring the application of ordinary criminal law 
governed by human rights standards instead of military force. 
Justice Stevens’ determination that the U.S. conflict with al 
Qaeda was non-international may have made sense for the limited 
purpose he intended—to establish that even the minimalist 
protections of CA3 were sufficient to establish the fatally flawed 
nature of the Guantánamo military commissions. But the broader 
implication that the United States might have the right to strike 
foreign nationals in distant states subject only to the modest 
limitations associated with non-international armed conflict defies 
logic given that the very legal foundation of those rules is based on 
the prerequisite of a sovereign state acting within its own territory. 
Beshai’s article provides a logical, and highly original, 
conceptualization for reconciling these contradictions. He argues that 
rather than considering the conflict against al-Qaeda—which clearly 
does not qualify as a nation-state—and its various branches to be a 
single legal entity, we should adopt an “epicenter of hostilities” 
approach in which we disaggregate the overall conflict into a series 
of subcomponent parts, each located in an individual nation in which 
violent activity is focused. In some instances it may be determined 
that the situation within that nation fails to satisfy the level of 
ongoing violence necessary to establish the legal existence of an 
armed conflict. Where that is the case it will be necessary, as a 
matter of law, to treat the local perpetrators as criminals and rely 
upon domestic law enforcement rules and processes to counter the 
threat (as has traditionally been done with the vast majority of all 
terrorist acts to date, including the only actual terrorist uses of 
weapons of mass destruction—the nerve gas attacks carried out by 
Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo cult). Where the situation does lawfully rise 
to the level of an armed conflict, Beshai makes a strong case that it 
should be treated as a non-international armed conflict between the 
local state and the terrorist group, in which case international law 
allows the United States (and other concerned third states) to 
intervene in support of the affected state if it so requests. While this 
approach would logically impose greater limits on U.S. freedom of 
28. Id. at art. 1, ¶ 2.
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action than the current essentially unilateral approach, it 
offers substantial advantage in terms of soundly grounding 
counter-terrorism efforts within recognized legal rules and avoids the 
establishment of new precedents for military intervention in the 
territory of non-consenting third states which will ultimately 
contribute to a less stable and less secure world order. 
III. COMPENSATING FORMER GUANTÁNAMO
DETAINEES FOR MISTREATMENT
The second article in this issue is Cameron Bell’s insightful 
examination of the government’s obligation to compensate former 
Guantánamo detainees.29 Treating 9/11 as an armed attack and the 
subsequent conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban as a “war” 
allowed the United States to draw upon longstanding international 
legal authority to preventively detain opposing fighters for the 
duration of hostilities. 
The details of this authority, however, are clouded by the 
government’s failure to coherently identify which governing 
international legal rules apply; it has instead seemed to focus its 
energy on detailing which do not, exempting, for example, al Qaeda 
from any application of the Geneva Conventions at all while 
unilaterally concluding that Taliban fighters fail to qualify for their 
specific protections even if the treaties are otherwise applicable to 
Afghanistan. It has further endeavored to avoid legal scrutiny via the 
employment of offshore detention facilities, most prominently at the 
U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Not surprisingly, then, 
Bush administration lawyers such as John Yoo and Jay Bybee 
articulated broad authority to engage in coercive interrogation 
practices that objective observers would consider to constitute 
torture. 
A total of 779 men and boys have been detained at Guantánamo; 
115 remained there as of May 2015 including 51 who had previously 
been cleared for release.30 The vast majority of those detained were 
“sold” to the United States or coalition forces in response to bounty 
29. Cameron Bell, Repatriate . . . Then Compensate: Why the United States Owes
Reparation Payments to Former Guantánamo Detainees, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867 (2015). 
30. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Guantánamo by the Numbers, www.aclu.org
/infographic /guantanamo-numbers?redirect=national-security/Guantanamo-numbers (last visited 
July 14, 2015). 
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offers, only 8 percent were considered by the government to be 
“Al-Qaeda fighters.”31 Many of these men have been subjected to 
extremely harsh treatment, some to outright torture. But the 
government has never admitted any wrongdoing nor offered any of 
these men compensation, or even an apology. To paraphrase Erich 
Segal, it seems to have adopted the mantra, “Guantánamo means 
never having to say you’re sorry.” 
Bell examines the history of Guantánamo detention and the 
surrounding legal issues, particularly the application of the 
euphemistically titled “enhanced interrogation techniques.” After 
providing compelling evidence that U.S. detainee treatment 
constituted significant violations of international law, she explores 
state obligations to provide reparations under both customary legal 
rules governing state responsibility as well as specific treaty 
obligations under the Convention Against Torture.32 Bell then 
examines the complete lack of success detainees have had pursuing 
compensation via such vehicles as the Alien Tort Statute,33 Federal 
Tort Claims Act,34 and Torture Victim Protection Act35 despite the 
U.S. international legal obligations to provide remedies for this sort 
of conduct. She offers plausible recommendations for judicial 
correction of this deficiency before ultimately concluding that the 
detainees’ best hope lies in getting foreign nations to pursue the issue 
on their behalf under international legal principles of state 
responsibility. 
IV. DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZENS AWAY FROM
THE THEATER OF WAR 
The third article is an analysis by Diana Cho of the current status 
of U.S. authority to detain its own citizens in the ongoing war.36 This 
question is complicated by the existence of a federal statute, “the 
Non-Detention Act”37 enacted to prevent recurrence of unilateral 
31. Id.
32. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
34. Id. § 1346 .
35. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
36. Diana Cho, The NDAA, AUMF, and Citizens Detained Away from the Theater of War:
Sounding a Clarion Call for a Clear Statement Principle, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927 (2015). 
37. Non-Detention Act, Pub. L. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
(2006)). 
Spring 2015] LAW OF WAR ISSUE INTRODUCTION 825 
executive-branch deprivations of liberty such as the World War II 
internment of Japanese Americans. The Non-Detention Act flatly 
declares that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained 
by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”38 In its 
2004 Hamdi decision, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion 
concluded that the AUMF was sufficient to implicitly authorize 
executive detention, even of a U.S. citizen being held in the United 
States, because this “is so fundamental and accepted an incident to 
war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ 
Congress has authorized the President to use.”39 The conclusion that 
the AUMF was a qualifying statutory authorization received a fifth 
vote from Justice Thomas, who otherwise dissented from the Court’s 
remand for further judicial consideration, arguing that the 
government had already met its burden of justifying Hamdi’s 
captivity.40 
The Court’s approval of Hamdi’s continuing detention was 
conditioned upon the fact that the petitioner was an “enemy 
combatant” who was “part of or supporting forces hostile to the 
United States or coalition partners” who had “engaged in conflict 
against the United States” in Afghanistan.41 It left open the issue of 
what other limits on detaining citizens might apply, including 
whether Americans could be preventively detained if captured 
outside a theater of active hostilities. This specific issue was 
presented to the Court in the concurrent case of José Padilla—a 
citizen detained upon return from travel to South Asia at Chicago’s 
O’Hare airport. But in a decision handed down the same day as 
Hamdi, the justices deferred reaching the merits, holding instead that 
Padilla was suing the wrong party (the Secretary of Defense rather 
than his immediate custodian) in the wrong court (the Southern 
District of New York rather than South Carolina where he was then 
being held).42 The government ultimately charged Padilla with 
ordinary terrorism related crimes and convicted him in a regular 
federal court, mooting any further challenge to his military detention. 
Meanwhile Hamdi, a dual U.S.-Saudi national, was released shortly 
38. Id.
39. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 586–87, 594–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 516 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
42. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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after the Court’s decision in his case in exchange for agreeing to 
renounce his American citizenship.43 The Court has thus not had the 
opportunity to offer any further guidance with respect to the 
detention of U.S. citizens in the ongoing conflict. 
While the Court has not been heard from again, Congress has 
somewhat ambiguously reentered the fray. In December 2011, it 
included language in the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 which explicitly affirmed presidential 
authority under the AUMF for military detention of anyone who 
“who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, 
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners . . . .”44 This language made no 
exception based on nationality or location of capture. But a 
subsequent paragraph declares, “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the 
detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the 
United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in 
the United States.”45 A minor firestorm of public debate followed; 
some argue that the government already had the authority to detain 
citizens regardless of where they were captured so the NDAA didn’t 
change anything; some argue that the government did not have this 
authority previously and that the language about “nothing in this 
section . . .” means that they still do not; and some argue that the 
NDAA does in fact represent a substantial expansion of U.S. 
detention authority. 
Cho’s informative article examines the legal authorities and 
history underlying this controversy in detail. In order to protect 
American’s civil liberties, she argues that the Non-Detention Act’s 
protection of citizens against executive detention should only be 
trumped by a “clear congressional authorization,” and concludes that 
the ambiguous AUMF and NDAA language should be considered 
insufficient for this purpose. 
V. CYBER ATTACKS AS WARFARE?
Ryan Patterson contributes the fourth piece in this issue, a 
critical examination of another post-9/11 development, the increasing 
43. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 § 1021(b)(2) (2011).
45. Id. § 1021(e).
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use of the internet as a way to inflict harm remotely, and assessment 
of appropriate state responses to this challenge.46 In most cases the 
harm inflicted has been in the form of nuisance or economic 
interference with the functionality of particular websites, or general 
disruption of regular internet activity. But in at least one infamous 
instance—the use of the Stuxnet virus against Iranian nuclear 
centrifuges—the remote cyber activity actually inflicted physical 
damage. 
Both pundits and government officials have been quick to label 
activity of this type as “cyber warfare.” As part of this rush to treat 
cyber threats as actual, rather than metaphorical, conflict, a group of 
leading law of war practitioners and scholars came together under 
NATO auspices to produce the Tallinn Manual, a handbook for 
applying existing customary international law rules to these new 
developments.47 The U.S. government has gone farther, establishing 
the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the Army 
has just formally launched a new career branch, “Cyber Officer,”48 
providing an alternative to service in more traditional specialties 
such as Armor, Artillery, Infantry, and Intelligence. 
Bucking this trend, Patterson provides a concise explanation of 
internet functionality and terminology being used in this field before 
exploring a number of difficulties with the classification of cyber 
activity as warfare. He ultimately concludes that states would 
generally be better served by prosecuting cyber incidents as crime 
under domestic law, seeking reparations for violations from 
responsible states, and emphasizing improved domestic 
cybersecurity over focusing on militarization of the problem. 
VI. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS’ MISTAKES
In the final article in this issue, Kelly Cass takes us from the
present into the realm of future warfare, examining the issue of 
accountability for killing civilians by autonomous weapons, or 
46. Ryan Patterson, Silencing the Call to Arms: A Shift Away from Cyber Attacks as
Warfare, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 969 (2015). 
47. Int’l Grp. of Experts, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013), available at 
http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinnmanual?e=5903855/1802381. 
48. Jim Tice, Attention Officers: Sign up Soon for Cyber Transfers, ARMY TIMES (Apr. 16,
2015), available at http://armytimes.com/story/military/careers/army/officer/2015/04/16/army 
-cyber-voluntary-transfer-incentive-program/25811401/.
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“killer robots” as many critics choose to derisively term them.49 
While current U.S. drone use seems to have been a catalyst for much 
of the recent discussion on this subject, Cass begins by clarifying the 
important distinction between current remotely operated systems, 
which retain direct human control over all targeting decision, and 
actual autonomous weapons which, once activated, identify and 
engage targets without further involvement of a live individual. She 
notes that fully automated robots are in existence today, such as the 
U.S. Navy’s Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, but that the real 
concern is future weapons that will have some degree of “artificial 
intelligence,” rendering their future acts less predictable. 
Some participants in the robotic warfare debate have gone so far 
as to suggest that autonomous robots might themselves commit war 
crimes for which the machine should be held accountable. Cass 
demonstrates, however, that machines are incapable of the human 
thought process necessary to satisfy the mens rea requirements of 
criminal law. She then evaluates the ability of these robots to comply 
with the foundational principles of the law of war before considering 
possible avenues for specific regulations or prohibitions concerning 
their use. She concludes that existing regulations can fairly be 
understood to limit autonomous weapons to use against non-human 
targets, an interpretation which would effectively guard against the 
parade of horribles most “killer robot” critics postulate. 
The final part of Cass’s article provides a careful analysis of the 
potential financial and criminal liability for impermissible robotic 
killing. After considering each possible agent, she concludes that 
responsibility should lie just where it does for any other weapons 
system, with the operator who makes the decision to employ the 
weapon, as well as with the commander(s) responsible for that 
individual’s performance. 
49. Kelly Cass, Autonomous Weapons and Accountability: Seeking Solutions in the Law of
War, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017 (2015). 
